Summary Inviting the leviathan external forces war and state building in afghanistan
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Small Wars & Insurgencies
Inviting the Leviathan: external forces, war, and state-building
in Afghanistan
Jan Angstrom*
Swedish National Defence College, Stockholm
This article examines the role of intervening forces in state-building efforts
after state-collapse and civil wars. Based upon a case study from the 30 year...
Inviting the Leviathan: external forces, war, and
state-building in Afghanistan
Jan Angstrom
To cite this article: Jan Angstrom (2008) Inviting the Leviathan: external forces, war,
and state-building in Afghanistan, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 19:3, 374-396, DOI:
10.1080/09592310802228690
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592310802228690
Published online: 18 Sep 2008.
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, Small Wars & Insurgencies
Vol. 19, No. 3, September 2008, 374–396
Inviting the Leviathan: external forces, war, and state-building
in Afghanistan
Downloaded by [University of Western Ontario] at 03:32 03 January 2016
Jan Angstrom*
Swedish National Defence College, Stockholm
This article examines the role of intervening forces in state-building efforts
after state-collapse and civil wars. Based upon a case study from the 30 years
of war in Afghanistan, it develops an explanation for failure of state-building
attempts drawing upon bargaining theory, macrosociological state-building
theory, and strategic thought. The explanation suggests that international state-
building attempts condition and shapes a new strategic environment for the
local actors. In doing so, the mode of state-building can create incentives for
continuing the war or, carried out differently, create incentives for the parties
to contribute in building a legitimate state from the rubble of the old state.
Keywords: state-building; Afghanistan; war; international intervention;
bargaining theory; utility of force
War has often been thought to be intimately linked with the formation of states and
the system of states. Charles Tilly and others have long argued that the formation of
states in Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth century happened in
interaction with war.1 Due to the costs of war, it became necessary to establish a
centralised and well-functioning administration for extracting taxes. This process
was made possible, and later reinforced, by the centralisation of the means for
coercion. Eventually, only the state had the capabilities to wage war and war thus
forced the multi-plurality of actors in late medieval Europe to copy one another and
create the system of states. Today, however, the links between war and the
formation of states seems less than clear-cut. Protracted wars in Central Asia, West
as well as Central Africa have not generated strong states thus far.2
Instead, Western armed forces have increasingly been engaged in
internationally orchestrated and supported state-building efforts in the former
Third World since the end of the Cold War. There are numerous examples of this
type of intervention in failed states and, among others, Angola, Somalia,
Afghanistan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo spring to mind. However,
the success rate of such enterprises has not been entirely convincing. It seems that
many cases, in David Lake’s words, in time come to be ‘regarded not only as
*Email: Jan.angstrom@fhs.se
ISSN 0959-2318 print/ISSN 1743-9558 online
q 2008 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/09592310802228690
http://www.informaworld.com
, Small Wars & Insurgencies 375
failed states, but as state-building failures’.3 At the same time, in some cases
where international forces have been involved, perhaps most notably Cambodia,
a functioning state seems to have been reconstituted. How should this variation
be explained? Why does international state-building work in some cases and not
in others? To what extent can international forces contribute to creating a
Downloaded by [University of Western Ontario] at 03:32 03 January 2016
functioning state after state-collapse and civil war? And how should international
forces operate to successfully build states in the aftermath of civil war?
The underlying assumption behind many interventions in civil wars today is
that the intervening forces can do good. By intervening, it is thought, peace and
stability will ensue, democracy can be established, cleptocracy will end, and the
overall welfare of the population will rise. Intervening forces can, the argument
goes, provide security in order for the conflicting parties to demobilise and disarm
without fear of renewed attacks. By supervising ceasefires, making sure that the
combating parties stick to agreements and in some cases even by seizing political
control over the situation, they can start to rebuild a functioning state. And
intervening forces can facilitate local state-building initiatives by providing order,
stability, and sustain the initially weak indigenous state, while it recuperates and
starts to work. Central to the current state-building paradigm is that the intervening
forces will supervise and to some extent guarantee a swift election process and
democratisation. In turn democracy, it is claimed, creates institutions that can
overcome distrust, grievances, and allow for political participation.4
However, the underlying logic of this policy agenda has been criticised.
While some criticise the entire endeavour of trying to export a particular form of
social order – the state – to areas, which have no experience and perhaps no
infrastructure to operate as states; most critics focus on how state-building is
implemented in their explanations of failure of international state-building.
According to Roland Paris, the failure can be explained by an over-reliance upon
liberal theory on behalf of the international community. Democracy and the
market-economy are inherently competitive and in the immediate aftermath of
violent conflict, Paris argues, it is by no means sure that competition is something
the participants can handle without resorting to renewed armed conflict.5 Paris
suggests that one must first build a strong state – create a Hobbesian Leviathan,
‘a power to keep men in awe’ – before democratisation can start.6
Alexander Downes has pointed out some problems with the notion of external
forces serving as a Leviathan. Most importantly, the local parties are aware of the
fact that the international forces will be heading home at one point or another,
which means that the basic security problem for the actors remains. Incentives are
not to hand in any weapons and demobilise, but rather to hide the weapons and
prepare for renewed conflict. The invited Leviathan, in other words, is merely an
interlude before the coming war.7 Some also suggest that the poor track record of
international state-building is due to a lack of, or poorly implemented integration
of economic, political, diplomatic, and military efforts.8 Furthermore, some,
most notably Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, have suggested that
democratisation can lead to both internal and international war.9 Finally, the
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