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Rasmussen College > MA 279 / BSC 2347 - Quiz 3 A&p _ Set 1 Latest Guide - 15/15. $12.99   Add to cart

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Rasmussen College > MA 279 / BSC 2347 - Quiz 3 A&p _ Set 1 Latest Guide - 15/15.

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Rasmussen College > MA 279 / BSC 2347 - Quiz 3 A&p _ Set 1 Latest Guide - 15/15.

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  • August 21, 2024
  • 6
  • 2024/2025
  • Exam (elaborations)
  • Questions & answers
  • Ma 279
  • Ma 279
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winner only outcome we consider the single winner

partial ranking outcome we consider the top k candidates in order out of n total

a table that summarizes the preference ballots of all
the voters
preference schedule



All that maters is who received the most 1st place votes


Most political offices in the US use this method due to its simplicity
plurality voting (voting method)

This is most susceptible to insincere voting (voting for who has a chance, not who you
want)

candidate who wins majority when compared head to head with each of the other
Condorcet candidate
candidates

voters list candidates in order of their preference, candidates assigned points for
ranking


(1 point for last place, 2 for 2nd to last, etc)
Borda Count (voting method)
The candidate with the most points wins


Often used for sports/music industry awards, university presidents, corporate
executives, etc

1) Count first place votes for each candidate. If one
has a majority, they win. If none have a majority,
eliminate the candidate with the fewest 1st place
votes and transfer them down to the next eligible
candidate (2nd place votes) (this means their 2nd
place choice. If 10 people chose C A and 30 chose
C E and C is eliminated, 10 are transferred to A and
30 are transferred to E)


2) Recount the votes. If a candidate now has a
Plurality with elimination (voting method)
majority, they win, otherwise, eliminate and transfer
the first place votes based on the 3rd place
preference (if we're in round 2 and D is eliminated
with D C E, D's votes are transferred to E)


3) Repeat until there is a candidate with a majority of
the first place votes


If there are N voters voting, N/2+1 votes are needed
to win

aka ranked-choice voting
Instant Runoff (voting method)
Like the plurality method but with truncated ballots

, Each candidate is compared to one another. The
winner of the comparison gets a point

Method of Pairwise Comparisons
This method always chooses the Condorcet
(Copeland's Method, voting method)
candidate if there is one


n(n-1)/2 comparisons are needed

a theorem that demonstrates that a voting method that is guaranteed to always
produce fair outcomes is a mathematical impossibility


His criteria is as follows:


Majority criterion:
if there is a majority candidate, they should win


Condorcet criterion:
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
if there is a Condorcet candidate, they should win


Monotonicity criterion:
A candidate who would otherwise win should not lose merely become some voters
changed their ballots to favor that candidate


Independence-of-irrelevent-alternative:
a candidate who would otherwise win should not lose because one of the losing
candidates withdraws from the race

a formal voting arrangement where the voters are not necessarily equal in terms of the
number of votes they control


Weighted voting system The notation is [q: w1, w2, ..., wN] with w1 >= w2 >= ... >= wN


where q is the quota (minimum number of votes to pass a motion) and wk is the weight
of player k

When the quota is less then simple majority and we have a potential for both Yes and
No to win, this is anarchy


[10: 8,7,3,2]
Anarchy
If P1 and P4 vote yes
And P2 and P3 vote no


We have 10 vs 10

If the quota is more then the total number of votes in the system, no motion could ever
pass


Gridlock To prevent anarchy and gridlock, the quota MUST BE more then half the total number
of votes but never more then the total


V/2 < q < V (where V=w1+w2+...+wN)

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