MORE QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS:
DILEMMAS OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION
By Raimo Väyrynen
The world has largely internalized the moral imperative to provide relief to the victims
of humanitarian emergencies. Due to the increasing and diversified efforts by
nongovernmental organizations and governmental agencies, the international capacity
to deliver humanitarian aid is mostly in place. Obviously, the political will of govern-
ments and the capacity of the fragmented nongovernmental organization field to pro-
vide assistance is sometimes in doubt. However, the main humanitarian dilemma
concerns the political repercussions of assistance which has become a resource in and a
part of the dynamics of local conflicts. As the cases of Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia
indicate, military faction leaders have learned to take advantage of the relief operations,
which has resulted in their misuse and even prolonged the crisis (of which Sudan is a
good example). To alleviate this problem, one can pursue two avenues: either reform
the aid process or use military force more systematically to protect the deliveries and
people involved. The emphasis should be on the reform of humanitarian relief.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the international community has faced a major humanitar-
ian dilemma. The increasing number of victims, refugees, and internally
displaced people, due to civil wars and humanitarian emergencies, calls for
stronger efforts to reduce their devastating consequences. At the same time,
the international community is politically too timid, divided, and institu-
tionally weak to mount an effective response. In other words, there is a capa-
bility gap. As a result, the international community cannot address all
humanitarian crises in an equitable manner; that is, the principle of propor-
tionality is violated.1
This is a much revised version of a paper presented at the conference on “Humanitarian Response:
Preventing Deadly Conflict” organized by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Con-
flict and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Geneva, Switzerland, February 16–17,
1997.
PEACE & CHANGE, Vol. 24, No. 2, April 1999
© 1999 Peace History Society and
Consortium on Peace Research, Education, and Development
172
, Dilemmas of Humanitarian Action 173
While the capability gap is a systemic problem which affects the victims
most, the donors face the moral imperative to deliver humanitarian relief to all
those in need. The moral imperative is challenged by the possibility that aid
provides resources to the conflicting parties, helps to enrich the warriors, and
protracts the crisis. Thus, humanitarian action may foment and sustain war.
This is especially the case if the aim is to use crimes in war as a means to reap
immediate rewards.2
The capability gap and the moral imperative to deliver humanitarian
relief are related to each other in a somewhat paradoxical manner: the
stronger the capability of the international community to provide aid, the
greater is the possibility that it becomes a resource fueling the crisis. Thus,
local warriors may prefer the expansion of humanitarian relief, and can force
this result by increasing misery. This is especially the case if aid is distributed
in a manner that makes it possible for the warriors to exploit it.
Therefore, any reform in the international humanitarian system should
be designed to ensure that it keeps the local military-political factions in
check. Furthermore, aid deliveries, in addition to contributing to humanitar-
ian relief, should be consistent with efforts at conflict resolution and peace-
building. Humanitarian assistance cannot be disentangled from its potential
role in stopping fighting and creating peace.
However, the need for peace-building may create yet another policy
dilemma. Should the efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts go before the
provision of humanitarian aid or follow it, or should they be pursued in par-
allel? It may be, though, that the first option does not even exist, as people
with empty bellies are hardly able to make peace and take back the power
confiscated by the warlords. Therefore, aid should go first and efforts at
peace-building may follow. One possibility is that humanitarian aid and
peace-building should be entirely separated from each other. In this option,
humanitarian relief should be sui generis and provided only to alleviate
human death and suffering.
It is, of course, easy to say that humanitarian relief should be directed at
all the victims of the crisis. It is equally easy to suggest that relief should
empower the recipients to change the unjust and authoritarian structures of
society. Like most principles, those of impartiality and empowerment are dif-
ficult to realize. People in crisis areas are often under the tutelage of commu-
nity ethnic leaders and political clans. People in distress are utterly dependent
on the powers that be, but they also participate in what David Keen calls
“bottom-up violence” to achieve their own short-term gains.3
The present humanitarian situation is further complicated by the great
diversity of actors at both ends of the aid chain. The role of governments in
, 174 PEACE & CHANGE / April 1999
the crisis areas has shrunk and may have even collapsed. As a result, there may
not be any coherent political framework in which the aid workers can oper-
ate. Also, in the donor communities the share of governmental relief has
declined and that of multilateral agencies and of nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) has increased. This may have reduced the political uses of relief
to serve donor interests, but it has also created new problems of inter-agency
coordination and professional competence. It is possible that the growing
number of agencies on the ground enables the warlords to manipulate them
and loot the supplies for their own use.
Most critical observers even argue that the situation has gotten out of
control and new methods to impose greater discipline on the humanitarian
aid process are needed. They also point out that massive amounts of relief are
often delivered without any reliable information on the number of people
affected by the crisis. The figures may also be vastly exaggerated by the aid
agencies in whose interests it is to collect money, food, and medicine to be
transferred by their bureaucracies to the field. In the vast international relief
business, the original humanitarian motives of assistance are easily lost.4
This article explores the changing nature of humanitarian crises and its
implications for humanitarian responses. The aim is to understand the nature
of humanitarian dilemmas in today’s crises and possible ways to resolve these
dilemmas. The article also explores the relationship between the prevention
and resolution of crises and the provision of humanitarian relief.
HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES
Humanitarian emergencies are not a homogeneous group of phenomena. On
the contrary, their nature, extent, and intensity vary considerably from one
case to another. Therefore, international responses to mitigate and terminate
them also vary; that is, there is no single pattern of response. Moreover, as
mentioned, the responses are shaped significantly by the capabilities and
commitments of governmental and nongovernmental agencies. As a result of
learning processes, international responses have changed in interesting ways
in the present decade.
The 1990s can be justly called a decade of humanitarian emergencies.
Due to the recent dissipation of cold war tensions, the growing globalization
and inequality of the world economy, and the ensuing economic deteriora-
tion and political instability, developing countries have experienced a series of
deep humanitarian crises. The increase of crises in the recent past is not an
accident, but rather an omen of the deepening social and political crisis in the
