Economics 4139 - Study guides, Class notes & Summaries

Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies Exercises & Solutions Exercise 1 Monopoly with quality choice Consider a monopolist who sells batteries. Each battery works for h hours and then needs to be replaced. Therefore, if a consumer buys q batteries, he gets H = qh hours of operation. Assume that the demand for batteries can be derived from the preferences of a representative consumer whose indirect utility function is v = u(H) pq, where p is the price of a battery. Suppose that u ...

Consider a monopolist who sells batteries. Each battery works for h hours and then needs to be replaced. Therefore, if a consumer buys q batteries, he gets H = qh hours of operation. Assume that the demand for batteries can be derived from the preferences of a representative consumer whose indirect utility function is v = u(H) pq, where p is the price of a battery. Suppose that u is strictly increasing and strictly concave. The cost of producing batteries is C(q) = qc(h), where c is stric...

Exercise 1 Monopoly with quality choice Consider a monopolist who sells batteries. Each battery works for h hours and then needs to be replaced. Therefore, if a consumer buys q batteries, he gets H = qh hours of operation. Assume that the demand for batteries can be derived from the preferences of a representative consumer whose indirect utility function is v = u(H) pq, where p is the price of a battery. Suppose that u is strictly increasing and strictly concave. The cost of producing bat...

Part II. Market power Exercises & Solutions Exercise 1 Monopoly with quality choice Consider a monopolist who sells batteries. Each battery works for h hours and then needs to be replaced. Therefore, if a consumer buys q batteries, he gets H = qh hours of operation. Assume that the demand for batteries can be derived from the preferences of a representative consumer whose indirect utility function is v = u(H) pq, where p is the price of a battery. Suppose that u is strictly increasing a...

Consider a monopolist who sells batteries. Each battery works for h hours and then needs to be replaced. Therefore, if a consumer buys q batteries, he gets H = qh hours of operation. Assume that the demand for batteries can be derived from the preferences of a representative consumer whose indirect utility function is v = u(H) pq, where p is the price of a battery. Suppose that u is strictly increasing and strictly concave. The cost of producing batteries is C(q) = qc(h), where c is stric...