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Philosophy of Science Short Answer Questionsm 1
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Philosophy of Science Short AnswerQuestions
1.0 Give a classification of different kinds of realism - correct answer-0 Metaphysical realism
(there is a mind-independent world)
1 Reality is prior to thought (we do not project a structure on to the world, rather, we discover
the structure of the world)
2 Semantic realism (our theories are genuinely referring)
3 Epistemic optimism (we have cognitive access to a mind-independent world)]
1.1 Give a classification of different kinds of antirealism - correct answer-1. Humean
Scepticism denies the realist notion that we have cognitive access to a putative
mind-independent world (i.e. epistemic optimism ), and finds the development of true
theories as an implausible objective for science.
2. Similar to the Humean Scepticism, Reductive Empiricism denies epistemic optimism as
described above. However, this account also rejects the claim that the semantic value of
terms occurring from different theories or arguments (i.e. semantic realism). For example,
the Reductive Empiricist would reject the claim that theoretical terms which do not refer to
observable entities should still be accepted into our cognitive set of linguistic references to
the world.
3. Constructivism denies both epistemic optimism and semantic realism, but also adds a
general denial of the idea that the reality is prior to thought such world has an existing
mind-independent structure (and that scientific discoveries then is just discoveries of a
structure already existing and not just a mere projection of a theory we just invented).
4. Idealism rejects the existing, mind-independent world itself (and not just the structure of it,
as the Constructivists would).
1.2 What is the so-called Inference to the Best Explanation and what role does it play in the
scientific realism debate? - correct answer-Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) is a
general method for explaining an event. IBE consists in selecting the best explanation for a
given event or event type using a set of considerations thought to contribute to the goodness
of an explanation (e.g. simplicity, power, coherence, lack of ad-hoc modifications).
The no miracles argument (NMA) for scientific realism is a version of IBE. Given the amount
of success science has had as a general method of explanation to argue in favour of
scientific realism, one could infer that the best explanation is that scientific theories describe
the world in a literal way. Put differently, if science did not produce theories that described
the world and a literal way, it's difficult to account for how useful it's been in predicting and
explaining the phenomena in the natural world.
1.3 What are theoretical terms and why are they significant in the realism debate? - correct
answer-Theoretical terms putatively refer to the unobservable entities mentioned in scientific
theories (e.g. electrons, atoms, quarks, etc). Because these entities are things that people
can't observe directly, it's possible that some theoretical terms are non-referring. A realist
would claim that scientific theories offer literal descriptions of the world, and so the realist
would claim that theoretical terms refer to actual entities in the world. However, this claim is
,difficult to justify when theoretical entities are unobservable. The anti-realist does not have
the same problem. She claims that scientific theories do not offer literal descriptions of the
world beyond what people can observe directly. The anti-realist is not committed to the
existence of theoretical entities and views them merely as useful conceptual tools.
2.1 What is an explicit definition of a theoretical term, and what are the main problems of
such a definition? - correct answer-An explicit definition of a theoretical term directly
connects a theoretical term with a term describing something directly observable: For all x:
Tx ←→ Ox where Tx stands for the theoretical term and Ox for an Observational term that
the Theoretical term can be explained through. A component of reductive empiricism, explicit
definitions reduce all potentially vague and obscure theoretical language to language that is
directly tied to empirical observations, an observational language.
Problems :
- One main problem with this practice is that some theoretical terms, while being potentially
useful, will not have direct correlates in an observation language and, through being made
explicit, will be left out of the theoretical language. Further, the introduction of new
observational tools with overlapping functions adds potentially redundant theoretical terms.
Conversely, one observable counterparts that one may use will also encounter changes in
meaning as time goes by. A theoretical term that is defined by this specific observable would
have to either find itself loose meaning, or having to change the explanatory observable and
be explained by something else.
- Further, tying each theoretical term to an observational term eliminates the possibility of
terms referring to dispositions in a theoretical language. For example, though one might be
able to indirectly infer flammability by setting a thing on fire, can one directly observe
something like flammability?
- Finally, explicit definitions presuppose a theoretical-observation dichotomy. It's unclear how
one is to cash this dichotomy out. What determines the limits of observation such that we
can cleanly demarcate a theoretical and an observational language?
2.2 What is constructive empiricism? - correct answer-Constructive empiricism is an
anti-realist account of scientific theories introduced by Bas van Frassen.
- Accepts metaphysical realism
- Accepts metaphysical structural realism
- Accepts semantic realism
- Rejects epistemic optimism
Constructive empiricism affirms the claim that the language of scientific theories must be
taken literally (rather than metaphorically) and are true or false based on their compatibility
with empirical observations of the phenomena they're meant to explain. However, the
constructive empiricist rejects the claim that a scientific theory's compatibility with these
empirical observations justifies any belief that the theory offers any information about the
mind-independent world beyond what is observable. In brief, the constructive empiricist
assumes an observable/unobservable dichotomy and advocates for a belief in claims made
about observables and agnosticism about the unobservable.
2.3 Illustrate the argument from underdetermination with an example and explain its
implications for scientific realism - correct answer-Given all of the available evidence about a
certain phenomenon, the argument from underdetermination says that when there are
multiple scientific theories that are equally compatible with that evidence, there is no way,
, given that evidence, that one can determine a superior scientific theory or a scientific theory
that explains the phenomenon the best. For example, let's say it's a windy day and I walk
into a room with an open window and a broken vase. One theory to explain the broken vase
might claim that the wind blew it over. A second theory to explain broken vase might claim
that a bird flew by and knocked it over. If we take compatibility with empirical evidence as the
only way of determining the better theory, there is no way in this example to choose between
the first or second theory. Put differently, there is no evidence for the realist to justify the
belief that either theory is a true reflection of the world. One can't know which theory to be a
realist about, and so one can't be a realist.
3.1 How, if at all, does the Pessimistic Meta-Induction undermine scientific realism? - correct
answer-Pessimistic Meta-Induction (PM-I) undermines the epistemic optimism of scientific
realism through making an inductive inference about the inductive reasoning of science
(hence, "meta-induction"). In particular, PM-I makes an inductive inference about scientific
theories to reject realism. Instead of observing the success of scientific theories and offering
scientific realism as an inductive explanation for that success (a la the No Miracles
Argument), the PM-I observes the rejection of every scientific theory before the current
scientific theories and offers scientific anti-realism as an explanation for why each of these
theories have been rejected. Further, the PM-I claims that the current theories, by the same
inductive inference, are also likely false.
A realist can counter this by claiming that the PM-I misrepresents scientific theories as a set
by including "immature" theories, which should not be used to undermine realism. In order to
make this claim, a realist must distinguish between something like "mature" scientific
theories and "immature" scientific theories.
3.2 Why, according to Laudan, is there no connection between a theory's success and its
approximate truth? - correct answer-First of all, Laudan cites several theories (e.g. crystalline
spheres of ancient and medieval astronomy, humoral theory of medicine, effluvial theory of
static electricity, etc.) in the history of science that were explanatorily successful but that had
terms that were non-referring, that is, that made use of entities that do not exist in reality.
Secondly, there is no coherent definition of what is meant by "approximate". Even on a
minimal definition (as offered by Laudan himself) where approximate truth is merely the
difference in quantity of truth content in a specific theory and the falsity content, there is no
plausible connection to consequences deriving from this theory that themselves are true.
Further, as Laudan claims, for a theory to even approximate truth, the entities of which it
makes use must genuinely refer, that is, they must things that exist in reality.
Laudan reconstructs the No Miracles Argument (NMA) as the following logical argument
relating approximate truth P and empirical success of a theory Q:
If P then Q
We have Q
But that does not mean P. Accepting P would be committing the fallacy of affirming the
consequent.
3.3 Why, according to Kuhn, is theory change not cumulative? - correct answer-Kuhn offers
a description of how science is practiced and observes that scientific fields often adopt a
main theory through which their research is guided during normal science. One can consider
that research during normal science is cumulative. However, when a certain theory under a
paradigm is shown to be inadequate for explaining some important problem in a given field
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